U.S. State and Local Fiscal Policies and Nonmetropolitan Area Economic Performance: A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis by Yu, Yihua & Rickman, Dan S.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
U.S. State and Local Fiscal Policies and
Nonmetropolitan Area Economic
Performance: A Spatial Equilibrium
Analysis
Yihua Yu and Dan S. Rickman
12 March 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44986/
MPRA Paper No. 44986, posted 17 March 2013 19:52 UTC
U.S. State and Local Fiscal Policies and Nonmetropolitan Area Economic Performance: 
A Spatial Equilibrium Analysis
*
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Yihua Yu 
Renmin University of China 
Beijing, China 100872 
yihua.yu@ruc.edu.cn 
 
 
and 
 
 
Dan S. Rickman 
Oklahoma State University 
339 Business Building 
Stillwater, OK 74074 
dan.rickman@okstate.edu 
 
 
 
Abstract. Faced with declining economic bases, many nonmetropolitan areas increasingly have 
become concerned about their future economic viability. A crucial dimension of this concern is 
the balancing of the need to be cost-competitive in terms of lower taxes against the need for 
provision of valued government services. Using a spatial equilibrium framework, this study 
econometrically examines the nexus between U.S. state and local fiscal policies and 
nonmetropolitan county growth in earnings and housing rents during the 1990s. The results 
suggest that state and local fiscal characteristics were important location determinants. Some 
characteristics could be clearly identified as having dominant firm profit effects while numerous 
others were identified as having household amenity effects. In addition, fiscal policies appeared 
to be more important for economic growth of nonmetropolitan counties which were remote from 
metropolitan areas than they were for counties adjacent to metropolitan areas. 
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1. Introduction 
Dating at least as far back as Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971) state and local 
governments have long been thought to use fiscal policy to promote economic growth. Faced 
with declining resource-based industries and competition with low-cost producers worldwide, 
many rural areas in the United States could be especially expected to be interested in using fiscal 
policy to broaden their economic bases and stimulate growth. Yet, the economic declines 
experienced in rural areas place stress on governmental services, putting rural governments in the 
difficult position of balancing the demand for needed services with the desire to be cost-
competitive with their tax policies.  
In a general review of regional tax studies, Bartik (1991) concludes there is a modest 
negative relationship between the magnitude of most taxes and metropolitan and state growth.  
On the other side of the ledger, in his review of the literature Fisher (1997) reported that some 
government expenditures consistently have positive effects, particularly those on highway 
transportation, though he found less support for education and safety expenditures. Helms (1985) 
found that taxes used to finance transfer payments such as welfare expenditures reduced growth, 
while those used to finance public services such as highways and education did not reduce 
growth, suggesting that it was important to control for categories of public expenditures in 
examining the effects of taxes.
1
 Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) found greater education 
expenditures and lower taxes as stimulating metropolitan area employment growth. Brown, 
Hayes and Taylor (2003) found that while some state and local expenditures more than offset the 
negative effect of taxes, most did not.  Brown and Taylor (2006) found that the net effect of the 
size of state and local government changed over time, having negative effects on private sector 
growth in the 1980s, but likely on balance maximizing private sector growth in the 1990s.
2
  
                                                          
1 In a meta-analysis of the studies examined by Bartik (1991), Goss (1995) concludes that studies which fail to 
control for public services understate negative tax effects. 
2
Likewise, Deskins and Hill (2010) found evidence that the negative effects of taxes on state economies have 
diminished from 1985 to 2003, as the variation in the size of state and local government diminished. 
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Mixed evidence also has been reported for nonmetropolitan areas and for industries of 
particular interest to rural areas. Henderson and McNamara (2000) found food manufacturing to 
be sensitive to state and local tax burdens in the Corn Belt region. Goetz (1997) also found such 
a relationship for food manufacturing establishment growth among all U.S. counties. Yet, for 
nonmetropolitan counties in the lower 48 U.S. states, Lambert and McNamara (2009) did not 
find any negative significant relationships between the property tax burden and the location of 
various types of food manufacturing plants. Among nonmetropolitan Indiana counties, Rainey 
and McNamara (1999) reported that manufacturing firms tended to avoid counties with relatively 
high property tax rates. Monchuk et al. (2007) found that increased local tax burdens had a 
negative impact on income growth in Midwest rural counties, as did state personal and corporate 
income taxes. Hammond and Thompson (2008) found that human capital investment increased 
per capita income growth in U.S. nonmetropolitan labor market areas, while public infrastructure 
investment did not. Huang, Orazem, and Wohlgemuth (2002) found that local government 
expenditures on public welfare and highways increased rural population growth in the Midwest 
and South. They further found that the net effect of local government expenditures and taxes is 
approximately zero, or slightly negative, on rural working-age populations.  
Thus, consistent with the conclusion of Wasylenko (1997), the results continue to vary 
widely across studies, making it difficult to understand the ways and extent state and local fiscal 
policies influence economic activity. Given the inconclusive evidence and the continued interest 
in the issue among policy makers, this paper examines the relationship between economic 
growth in U.S. nonmetropolitan counties and state and local fiscal policies. Using U.S. Census 
data we examine the effects of state and local fiscal policies on nonmetropolitan county earnings 
and housing rents during the 1990s.  
The analysis rests on the widely used spatial equilibrium approach of Roback (1982) 
which was adopted for examination of state and local fiscal policies by Gyourko and Tracy 
(1989; 1991) for U.S. metropolitan areas. A primary advantage of the spatial equilibrium 
approach over employment or population growth regressions is its ability to determine whether 
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the tax policies mostly work through affecting firm profitability or household amenity 
attractiveness of a region (Beeson and Eberts, 1987; 1989).
 3
 In addition to an overall assessment 
for nonmetropolitan counties generally, we also examine sub-samples to determine whether state 
and local fiscal policies matter less for nonmetropolitan counties which are not adjacent to 
metropolitan areas (Rainey and McNamara, 2002).  
The next section presents the basic spatial equilibrium model used in this study. Included 
is a review of the metropolitan results of Gyourko and Tracy (1989; 1991) to illustrate the spatial 
equilibrium channels through which fiscal policies can affect earnings and housing rents. In 
addition to extending the Gyourko and Tracy studies to nonmetropolitan areas, we also expand 
the framework to consider firm location effects of fiscal policies. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical implementation of the model. Presentation and discussion of results follow in section 
4. We find consistent evidence that the composition of state and local fiscal characteristics 
significantly influence the location of households and firms. We also find fiscal characteristics to 
be more important in nonmetropolitan counties which are not adjacent to metropolitan areas than 
in those which are adjacent. Section 5 contains a brief summary and concluding statements. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework follows the spatial general equilibrium approach of Roback 
(1982) and Beeson and Eberts (1989). In this framework, spatial differentials in wages and land 
rents are assumed to reflect capitalized equilibrium values of site specific characteristics to firms 
and households. Among the site characteristics which distinguish the attractiveness of regions for 
firms and households are the tax and expenditure policies of state and local governments 
(Gyourko and Tracy, 1989; 1991; Brown, Hayes and Taylor, 2003; Brown and Taylor, 2006). 
                                                          
3
 An alternative approach is to use a structural model.  For example, Laurent, Mignolet and Meunier (2009) use a 
structural model to examine which fiscal instruments could best offset a productivity disadvantage in a lagging 
region for France.  
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2.1 Basic Model 
The model assumes an economy comprised of two optimizing representative agents: the 
household and the firm. A representative household earns income from selling one unit of labor 
and chooses amounts of a composite good (X), residential land (Lh), and site characteristics (s) so 
as to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint: 
max ( , ; )hU X L s  subject to hw+I = X +rL               (1) 
where w and r represent the wage and land rental rates, respectively; I denotes nonlabor income 
which is assumed to be independent of worker location (s). The above can be solved to obtain the 
indirect utility function, which is assumed equal across regions in equilibrium because of perfect 
mobility of households (Roback, 1982):
4
 
VsrwV );,(                                             (2) 
where Vw > 0, Vr  < 0, and with the sign of  Vs  depending on whether s is an amenity or 
disamenity.  
A representative firm produces the composite good X according to a constant-returns-to-
scale production function in terms of labor and land: X(Lf, N; s), where Lf  is land used in 
production and N is the number of units of labor, and s operates as a profitability shifter. The 
good is traded nationally without frictions and hence has normalized price equal to unity. For a 
given quantity of X, the firm minimizes costs in choosing the quantities of land and labor. 
Assuming perfectly mobile firms, costs are equalized across locations and set equal to the 
normalized price of the traded good: 
  1);,( srwC ,         (3) 
where Cw  > 0, Cr > 0, while the sign of  Cs depends on how s affects production costs.  
Assuming that the values of all characteristics are capitalized into wages and land rents in 
spatial equilibrium, the effects of site characteristics on wages and rents can be obtained by 
differentiating Equations (2) and (3) and solving for dw/ds and dr/ds (Roback, 1982; Beeson and 
                                                          
4
 Evidence of high U.S. labor mobility pre-2000 can be found in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Partridge et al. 
(2011).  
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Eberts, 1989).
5
 In equilibrium, site characteristics which are considered attractive (positive 
amenities) by households increase land rents and decrease wages. Characteristics valued by firms 
increase both land rents and wages. Thus, characteristics valued by both firms and households 
unambiguously raise land rents, while the wage effect depends on whether the firm or household 
effect dominates. Thus, in reduced form, wages and rents both are a function of the site-specific 
characteristics. 
As shown in Table 1, the combined pattern in wages and rents can be used to determine 
whether the dominant effect of a location characteristic on the economy is related to firm 
profitability or household amenities (Beeson and Eberts, 1987). A characteristic which raises 
both wages and rents is interpreted primarily as profit enhancing. This can be seen in Table 1, for 
example, where an attribute is profitable but does not have any household amenity value. Even if 
the characteristic also makes an area more amenity-attractive, the net positive effect on wages 
indicates that the profitability effect dominates the amenity effect. Contrarily, a characteristic 
which reduces profitability reduces both wages and rents. If a characteristic increases land rents 
but lowers wages we know there is a dominant amenity effect ― shown in Table 1 as a 
characteristic which is amenity attractive but does not have any profitability effect. A 
characteristic raising wages but lowering rents is interpreted as having a dominant negative 
amenity effect. Whether a characteristic is household amenity attractive whatsoever is revealed 
by the effect on the real wage. For example, higher housing rents and an absence of a nominal 
wage effect indicates a positive household amenity effect. Similarly, a rise in wages but an 
absence of a rent effect indicates a negative household amenity effect. 
2.2 Spatial Equilibrium Fiscal Effects 
Gyourko and Tracy (1989; 1991) recognized that state and local government taxes and 
expenditures were among the characteristics which affected firm profitability and household 
                                                          
5
 Spatial equilibrium only requires that factor prices be fully flexible, though perfect labor mobility is required for 
the factor prices to fully reflect the values of site specific characteristics (Bayer, Keohane and Timmins, 2009). 
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amenity attractiveness of an area and hence wages and housing rents. Less congestion on the 
roadways, for example, can reduce transportation costs for firms and increase household utility. 
Taxes and government services though may differentially affect households versus firms. We 
review their findings below to illustrate fiscal policy channels of influence within the spatial 
equilibrium framework. 
In a reduced-form examination of wages across U.S. cities Gyourko and Tracy (1989) 
reported that state and local fiscal conditions explained almost as much of the variation in wages 
as did worker characteristics. The seven fiscal variables included three tax variables and four 
government services variables. As a group, the seven variables were significant across various 
model specifications. 
Higher local and state income tax rates were associated with higher gross wages, 
suggesting that workers needed to be compensated for higher taxes. Thus, local and state income 
taxes could be thought of as reducing the household amenity attractiveness of the city. Higher 
state corporate income taxes reduced wage rates, suggesting that corporate income taxes could 
not be shifted forward onto consumers or backwards onto capital owners. This fits the model 
above which contains a frictionless tradable good and perfectly mobile capital, in which higher 
corporate income taxes reduce firm profitability, reducing labor demand and nominal wages. 
Violent crime was positively associated with wages, suggesting it was a household disamenity. 
Likewise, lower fire protection acted as a household disamenity, raising wages. An education 
variable was insignificant. 
Although the above wage results are broadly consistent with fiscal policies affecting 
regional household amenity attractiveness, this can only be convincingly established by 
examining both the wage and housing price effects of fiscal policy differentials and calculating 
hedonic prices. Thus, Gyourko and Tracy (1991) examined the variation of both wages and 
housing prices across U.S. cities. In calculating hedonic prices for fiscal policy attributes, 
Gyourko and Tracy (1991) found that fiscal policy differentials were nearly as important as 
natural amenity differentials in determining the quality of life across cities. The fiscal 
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characteristics examined included combined state and local income taxes, state corporate income 
taxes, property taxes, and measures of police, fire, health, and education services. 
The fiscal characteristics having the greatest household amenity value were police and 
health services. However, the values were primarily reflected in lower wages as payments for 
lower violent crime and more hospital beds, being insignificant in the housing price equation. 
Fire protection also had a slightly positive household amenity effect. With both housing prices 
and wages estimated to be significantly lower with greater fire protection, counter to 
expectations, the results also suggested a dominant negative profitability effect ― an 
interpretation not considered by the authors.
6
  Lower wages also were significantly associated 
with better police protection. Education services were insignificant and had the wrong sign. 
 In terms of taxes, state and local income taxes exerted a negative household amenity 
effect through a negative housing price effect and an absence of a significant effect on wages. 
Thus, instead of higher gross wages as found in Gyourko and Tracy (1989), the negative amenity 
effect of income taxes was found to be capitalized into lower housing values. Higher property 
taxes significantly reduced housing values, and by assumption of the theoretical model, had no 
effect on wages; thus property taxes were interpreted as a household disamenity. Higher 
corporate income taxes were surprisingly found to be a positive amenity as they were associated 
with significantly lower wages and higher housing prices. Given the unlikelihood that corporate 
income taxes were shifted to nonresidents (consistent with the model above), the authors suggest 
the variable may have been capturing unaccounted for agglomeration effects which were passed 
on to residents in the form of higher housing prices. 
2.3 Reduced-Form Equations 
 The framework above then indicates that wages and rents can be written as reduced-form 
outcomes of the site specific characteristics, among which include state and local fiscal policies: 
w = f(FISCAL, z)          (4) 
r = g(FISCAL, z),          (5) 
                                                          
6
 Gyourko and Tracy (1991) did not consider potential profitability explanations for any of their results. 
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where FISCAL denotes a vector of state and local fiscal policies, and z denotes other site specific 
characteristics such as the natural amenity attractiveness of the area. The fundamental 
assumption is that the site characteristics are capitalized into wages and rents in equilibrium. The 
pattern of relationships between the factor prices and the fiscal characteristics across space reveal 
whether there are dominant household amenity or firm profitability effects, and also whether 
there are significant household amenity effects which are not dominant. 
3. Empirical Implementation 
Corresponding to equations (4) and (5), reduced form econometric equations are specified 
for both earnings and housing costs in U.S. nonmetropolitan counties (excluding counties in 
Alaska and Hawaii). Nonmetropolitan counties simply are those not included in metropolitan 
areas by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000.
7
 The full sample consists of 1,998 counties, which we 
also separate into two sub-samples according to the rural-urban continuum codes developed by 
the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The first sub-sample 
contains 1,040 nonmetropolitan counties which are adjacent to a metropolitan area. The second 
sub-sample contains 958 nonmetropolitan counties which are not adjacent to a metropolitan area. 
A list of the variables and descriptive statistics for the full sample are provided in Table 2. 
The change in the natural log of earnings for employed residents ( EARN

) and the change 
of the natural log of housing costs ( HCOST

) over the period 1990 to 2000 are the two primary 
dependent variables.
8
 Although our theory indicates that land rents should be examined, housing 
costs should be a good proxy for land rents because spatial differences in quality-adjusted 
residential housing prices primarily result from differences in the embedded land values (Davis 
and Palumbo, 2008). 
                                                          
7
 We follow the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis in merging independent cities with the surrounding county to 
form a more functional economic area (mostly in Virginia). 
8
 Total earnings have advantages over other possible measures of income in the hedonic framework. For example, 
per-capita income does not conform to the labor earnings construct in the hedonic model because it includes capital 
income. The average wage per job in the county could be unrepresentative of labor earnings, especially in rural areas 
with seasonal and part-time work; the mean wage measure would classify a person working one full-time job and 
two infrequent part-time jobs as having three separate jobs, which would likely result in a relatively low average 
wage for each job (Partridge et al., 2009).  
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The variable HCOST is constructed as the log of weighted average median gross rent ($ 
per month) of owner and renter-occupied housing units for 2000 (Gabriel, Mattey and Wascher, 
2003). For owner-occupied units, median housing prices are converted into imputed annual rent 
using a discount rate of 7.85% (Peiser and Smith, 1985).
9
 The monthly average of this amount 
along with the median monthly rent for the renter-occupied units, weighted by the shares of 
owner- and renter-occupied houses, is our median housing cost variable.  
Hence, in the full sample and the two sub-samples, for county i, located in state s, we 
specify the econometric hedonic equations as:   
0 1 2 3 4 5
W W W W W W W
is isis is is is isEARN SFISCAL CFISCAL REG AMENITY DEMOG      
   
                     (6)
0 1 2 3 4 5
R R R R R R R
isis is is is is isHCOST SFISCAL CFISCAL REG AMENITY STRUC      
   
       ...
           (7) 
The difference equations reflect an economy transitioning from one static equilibrium to another 
in response to a change in one or more site characteristics (Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser, 2002; 
Partridge and Rickman, 2010). Econometrically, a difference equation provides certain 
advantages over an equation in levels. For one, there are circumstances where there are 
consistent unobservable influences that bias the levels-based estimates. In differences we 
implicitly control for county level fixed effects. The difference equation has an additional 
advantage as it often reduces the severity of multicollinearity.  
SFISCAL is a vector of state fiscal attributes which includes five categories of state level 
tax revenues and seven categories of state level expenditure variables. For the state fiscal 
variables, we calculate effective tax rates by dividing state and local government tax revenues 
from individual income, sales, property, corporate income and other taxes by state personal 
income. The categories of government services also are divided by state personal income and 
include expenditures on highways, education (elementary and secondary), public safety (police 
protection, fire protection, and corrections), public health and hospitals, environment (natural 
resources, parks and recreation), housing (housing and community development, sewerage, and 
                                                          
9
 Partridge et al. (2010) and Rickman and Rickman (forthcoming) find that the choice of discount rate does not 
affect county level housing cost regressions because the discount rate is applied uniformly across counties. 
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solid waste management), and government administration (financial administration, judicial and 
legal). CFISCAL is a vector of county fiscal variables all divided by county personal income, 
including county property and sales taxes. These fiscal variables are obtained from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Census of Government (COG). Hence, the vector SFISCAL

 (CFISCAL

) is 
defined as the value of SFISCAL (CFISCAL) in 2002 minus the same for1992.
10
 
The REG vector includes several categories of dummy variables: Census division 
dummies (Pacific is the omitted division) used to capture growth differences common to a census 
division; and U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (ERS) dummy 
variables indicating whether a county historically is farming dependent, mining dependent, has 
30% of its lands as federally-owned, or is a recreational county. Also included in the REG vector 
are ERS rural-urban continuum dummy variables and a dummy variable reflecting whether the 
county is located in a state possessing a right-to-work law. Thus, in addition to controlling for 
county levels fixed effects through differencing, inclusion of these dummy variables controls for 
common unobserved influences on growth. 
Further, we introduce a vector of natural amenity attributes (AMENITY) that may affect 
changes in earnings and housing costs. Natural amenity variables include the following 
measures: the average temperature for January and July, respectively, the average number of 
days with sunshine in January and the average humidity for July, the percentage of county area 
that is covered by water; the topography score index. These amenity variables also are taken 
from ERS (McGranahan, 1999). Although these variables are fixed over time, changing demands 
for amenities can lead to persistent regional growth differences (Graves, 1980). 
We control for the influence of population characteristics on earnings by including 
demographic variables (DEMOG

) in equation (6). The DEMOG vector includes six age and five 
racial composition variables, four education variables, the percentage of population that are 
                                                          
10
 The omitted fiscal variables are intergovernmental revenues, non-general revenues, non-general expenditures (i.e., 
liquor store, utility, or insurance trust expenditures), and welfare expenditures. Thus, the coefficient for each fiscal 
variable should be interpreted as the effect of increasing that expenditure or tax while reducing the average of the 
omitted categories. 
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female, married, and had a linguistic isolation problem, respectively. Also we control for housing 
characteristics by including several housing quality related variables (STRUC

) in equation (7). 
The STRUC vector contains the median number of rooms in the structure, the age of housing 
units, the shares of 1-5 bedrooms out of total rooms, the share of  housing units that are mobile 
homes, and the shares with complete plumbing and kitchen. The median number of rooms 
indicates the size of the housing unit. The age differences in the housing units reflect the 
differences in construction technology, type and efficiency of mechanical systems (for example, 
heating and wiring) and the time over which the structure has been subject to normal wear and 
tear (Galster, 1987).  
One of our empirical concerns is that county labor and housing markets could influence 
the local fiscal variables, indicating reverse causality. For example, the greater are home values 
in a county the lower are the tax rates needed to generate revenues to finance governmental 
programs. Alternatively, a struggling region may be more prone to cut taxes or spend money on 
categories believed to be productive such as on highways. If this is the case, OLS estimates of 
Equations (6)-(7) would be biased and inconsistent. Likewise, there may be common shocks 
underlying the state fiscal variables and county earnings and housing prices, inducing statistical 
endogeneity. 
To overcome the potential endogeneity of the fiscal variables, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation is implemented. Instruments are needed which affect the outcome variables only 
through the mechanism of the fiscal variables but are exogenous. Thus, we require variables that 
are strongly correlated with SFISCAL

 and CFISCAL

 but uncorrelated with the error term.  
Because of the difficulty in finding such instruments we use beginning-of-period (1992) 
levels of the fiscal variables as instruments for the subsequent differences. In addition, 
recognizing that the political system could affect the outcome of local fiscal policies, we also 
include two voting behavior variables as instruments. For instance, Republican governments may 
tend to favor low taxes and low spending while Democratic governments may tend to have 
higher levels of expenditures being financed by higher taxes. So, we consider as our first set of 
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instruments the fiscal variables in 1992 values plus two additional political voting behavior 
instruments. We use the percentage of votes cast for the Republican candidate in the 1972 
presidential election  (PRES_REP72) and the percentage of presidential election turnout in 1972 
(PRES_TO72), using deep lags to mitigate endogeneity. 
There are several tests of the IV regressions that we perform. First, to diagnose the 
possible endogeneity of SFISCAL

 and CFISCAL

, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is employed. 
Second, we employ the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio test to check the 
relevance of the excluded instruments. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model 
is identified and that the instruments are relevant. Third, we conduct the Anderson-Rubin 
likelihood ratio test to check whether the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. 
Lastly, we check the identification conditions for our instruments; i.e., we test whether the over 
identification restrictions hold (Sargan, 1958). 
Further, we conduct sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results. First, we 
exclude the demographic variables in the earnings equation and housing structure variables in the 
housing cost equation because as aggregate measures the DEMOG

 variable and STRUC

 
variables may be endogenous (Partridge et al., 2010, Rickman and Rickman, forthcoming). 
Second, in sensitivity analysis we omit the state level variables (state fiscal variables, census 
dummy variables, right-to-work dummy variable; ERS dummy variables) and replace them with 
state fixed effects variables in the IV estimation to control for all possible state level growth 
differences.  
We estimate standard OLS and IV models in our base case analysis and not spatial 
econometric models. We do this because spatial autocorrelation tests have difficulty determining 
whether spatial heterogeneity underlies the presence of spatial autocorrelation because of data 
pooling or whether it is of the nuisance variety arising from arbitrary boundaries of the units of 
analysis (McMillen 2003). We pool the data to obtain an average national effect and for 
increased efficiency of the estimates. Corrections for spatial autocorrelation also involve 
specification of an arbitrary weight matrix, for which there is no guarantee it is suitable to the 
 
 
14 
 
spatial process at hand and it is unlikely that the spatial dependence can be accurately captured 
by a single parameter on the weight matrix (Pinske and Slade, 2010). This especially applies in 
our setting where there are missing spatial observations because of the omission of metropolitan 
counties from the full sample, and particularly for the sub-samples of nonmetropolitan counties 
based on adjacency/non-adjacency to metropolitan areas.
11
 Spatial lag analysis likely suffers 
from the reflections problem, making causal identification problematic (Pinske and Slade, 2010); 
thus, spatial lag analysis is better suited for descriptively examining correlations among members 
or for predictive purposes as are time lags in time series forecasting. Nevertheless, in sensitivity 
analysis, we include weighted fiscal policy variables for neighboring counties and allow for 
spatial clustering in errors to produce robust estimated standard errors.
12
 
 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 contains the results from estimation of the housing rent growth regression 
(Equation (7)) for the full sample, while Table 4 contains the corresponding results for earnings 
growth (Equation (6)). The sole difference in specification of independent variables is the use of 
population characteristic variables in the earnings equation and the use of housing characteristic 
variables in the housing rent equation. In each table, the first column displays the results from 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. The second column displays the instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation results using beginning-period levels of the fiscal variables and political voting 
variables as the identifying instruments. IV estimates obtained after dropping the 
housing/population characteristic variables appear in the third column. The final column of 
results reflects the inclusion of state fixed effects to the IV column (2) model, while dropping all 
county-invariant variables.  
                                                          
11
 In a spatial hedonic application, Mueller and Loomis (2008) found that the potential inefficiency of OLS in the 
presence of spatially correlated errors was not economically significant, suggesting that nonspatial estimation was 
adequate. This may particularly be true in our setting because of the factors discussed above which make it 
problematic that efficiency can be improved with spatial estimation and may even be reduced. 
12
 All regressions were run in STATA 10. 
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From the first columns of results in Tables 3 and 4, the negative and significant effects 
for state individual income taxes and the category of other state taxes for both housing rents and 
earnings suggest dominant adverse firm profit effects. While personal income taxes could be 
expected to raise the earnings of the employed to reflect household disutility, the negative firm 
effect dominated to produce a net negative effect. This may particularly occur as owners of small 
establishments pay personal income taxes and CEOs of larger companies may be influenced by 
their personal income taxes in deciding where to locate their companies. The positive and 
significant signs for state public safety expenditures in both equations suggest dominant positive 
firm effects. Increased corporate incomes taxes are associated with significantly lower growth in 
housing rents as are increased expenditures on government administration. State expenditures on 
healthcare, and environment and housing, increased housing rent growth, which when combined 
with insignificant earnings effects suggest household amenity attractiveness. Sales taxes have 
unexpected positive signs in both equations. Sales taxes might be expected to increase earnings 
as a disamenity but then housing rent growth also should be lower. The county fiscal variables 
are generally insignificant, except for the significant negative sales tax effect on earnings growth. 
More importantly, the IV estimates in the second column of Table 3 reveal significant 
negative effects on housing rent growth from increased state property taxes, state individual 
income taxes, and other state taxes. Combined with insignificant earnings effects (Table 4), this 
suggests the taxes act as household disamenities. Increased state expenditures on highways, and 
environment and housing are found to increase housing price growth, but have insignificant 
effects on earnings, suggesting positive household amenity effects. Contrarily, negative housing 
rent effects are found for increased expenditures on state education, health care and government 
administration. State sales taxes and corporate income taxes are positively related to earnings, 
though they are insignificant for housing rents, suggesting household disamenity effects. The 
positive value for corporate income taxes is a surprise theoretically but empirically is consistent 
with the findings of Gyourko and Tracy (1991). Significant positive effects on both housing rents 
and earnings for county primary and secondary education suggest dominant firm profitability 
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effects. Highway expenditures are negatively related to earnings and insignificantly related to 
housing rents, suggesting household amenity attractiveness.  
The instrument tests at the bottom of column (2) in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the state 
and county fiscal variables are statistically endogenous. Based on the Anderson canonical 
correlation likelihood ratio tests the excluded instruments are relevant in both IV regressions and 
the models are identified. The Anderson-Rubin likelihood ratio tests also indicate that the 
endogenous variables are jointly significant in each equation. However, we reject that the over 
identification restrictions hold in each regression. 
As shown in column (3) of Tables 3 and 4, dropping the housing characteristic variables 
from Equation (6) and the demographic variables from Equation (7) hardly affects the IV results. 
A few variables slightly lose statistical significance in the two equations, while a few slightly 
gain statistical significance. This suggests that coefficient bias from potential endogeneity of the 
housing and population characteristics is not a major concern. 
The final columns of results in both tables reflect the addition of state fixed effects and 
the omission of all county-invariant variables (using the column 2 base model). State fixed 
effects control for unmeasured state level influences on growth in housing rents and earnings. 
The advantage of including state growth fixed effects is the reduction in possible omitted 
variable bias in estimating the county fiscal policy effects. The disadvantage is the loss of 
information on state level fiscal policy effects. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests that the county fiscal variables are endogenous. 
The tests also indicate that the models are identified and the endogenous variables are 
significant. In contrast to the other IV models containing state fiscal variables, the over 
identification restrictions hold in each equation at the five percent level. 
Consistent with expectations of property taxes being capitalized into land prices (Brown, 
Hayes and Taylor, 2003), county property taxes significantly and negatively influence housing 
rents but have no significant effect on earnings, suggesting a household disamenity effect. 
County sales taxes are insignificant in both equations. However, county expenditures on both 
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primary and secondary education and public safety have positive firm profitability effects. This 
suggests that counties need to worry more about their provision of public safety and education 
services to remain economically competitive in attracting firms than on lower sales taxes. In fact, 
the positive effect of public safety on housing rents exceeds the negative effect of property taxes. 
Highway expenditures have only a significant negative effect on earnings, and a positive 
insignificant effect on housing rents, suggesting a positive household amenity effect ― but not 
one that is dominant statistically. 
We next examine whether nonmetropolitan counties which are adjacent to metropolitan 
areas respond differently to fiscal policy changes than those which are not adjacent (Rainey and 
McNamara, 2002), though we continue to include dummy variables for the ERS rural-urban 
continuum county categories which pertain to the specific sub-sample. The results for the two 
sub-samples for both earnings and housing rents for the base IV model (column 2 model in 
Tables 3 and 4) are shown in Table 5. 
The base model instrumental variable evidence suggests fewer fiscal policy effects in 
nonmetropolitan counties adjacent to metropolitan areas relative to counties not adjacent to 
metropolitan areas. For metro-adjacent counties, only other state taxes have dominant negative 
firm effects. Corporate income taxes again have the unexpected positive earnings effect (i.e., a 
household disamenity effect). Negative expenditure effects on housing rents occur for state 
primary and secondary education and government administration, while positive effects on 
housing occur for expenditures on environment and housing. No significant county fiscal policy 
effects are found.  
Contrarily, for nonadjacent counties increased state property, individual income, and other 
taxes lower growth in housing rents, as do increased county sales taxes, in which combined with 
an absence of significant earnings effects suggests they are household disamenities. Increased 
state expenditures on highways and public safety increase housing rent growth, suggesting 
household amenity attractiveness, while expenditures on hospitals and health decrease growth. 
Both county expenditures on primary and secondary education (through increasing housing 
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rents) and highways (through lowering earnings) are revealed as positive household amenities. 
The near significance of the earnings effect of county education expenditures suggests a strong 
profitability role as well. 
In final sensitivity analysis, Table 6 shows the results of adding variables reflecting 
neighboring county fiscal variables and adjusting the standard errors for potential clustering of 
the residuals.  Neighboring counties are defined according to Bureau of Economic Analysis labor 
market regions, which are defined as groups of counties with tight commuting links.  Each 
county’s fiscal variable is weighted by its share of population in the region minus the county 
under study.
13
 Results for both the IV base model and IV state fixed effects models are presented 
in Table 6. 
The instrument tests at the bottom of column (2) in Table 6 suggest that the state and 
county fiscal variables are statistically endogenous (at the eight percent level in column (2)). 
Based on the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio tests the excluded instruments are 
relevant in both IV regressions and the models are identified (only at the 12 percent level in 
column (4)). The Anderson-Rubin likelihood ratio tests also indicate that the endogenous 
variables are jointly significant in each equation. Each equation passes the over identification 
restrictions test at the five percent level. 
The base model IV results suggest that the category of other state taxes acted as a 
household disamenity.  State expenditures on highways and on the category of environment and 
housing acted as a household amenity.  The county level results confirm the results in Tables 3 
and 4 for the IV base model and the IV state fixed effects model.  The IV state fixed effects 
results suggest that county property taxes acted as a household disamenity.  County level primary 
and secondary education expenditures statistically enhanced county productivity according to the 
base model IV results and nearly so according to the IV state fixed effects results.  These 
productivity effects dominated any possible amenity effects, to increase both earnings and 
                                                          
13
 The Cluster Command in STATA is used for estimation.  Comparable results are not reported for the adjacent and 
non-adjacent counties separately because labor market regions contain both types of counties, which make 
estimating clustering of the residuals problematic if they are not all included in the same sample during estimation. 
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housing costs.  Dominant productivity effects for public safety also are evidenced in the IV state 
fixed effects results. 
Regarding the neighboring county fiscal variables, neighboring county expenditures on 
primary and secondary education statistically reduce county productivity according to the IV 
base model.  Similar negative effects are found in the IV state fixed effects model, though the 
effects are less precisely estimated.  Thus, greater education expenditures in nearby counties 
appear to draw firms away from the county, creating backwash effects.  Higher sales taxes in 
nearby counties produce negative productivity effects, possibly through reduced demand 
(spread) effects.  Higher neighboring county property taxes act as a household amenity, 
suggesting that within labor market areas households avoid counties with higher property taxes.   
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Using a spatial equilibrium framework this study econometrically examined 
nonmetropolitan county growth in earnings and housing rents for the 1990s. Consistent evidence 
was found to suggest that state and local fiscal characteristics were important firm and household 
location determinants. Contributions of the study include the application of the approach to the 
study of nonmetropolitan areas and consideration of both household and firm effects. Some 
characteristics could be clearly identified as having dominant firm profit effects while numerous 
others could be identified as having household amenity effects. 
Focusing on the primary instrumental variable evidence for the full sample, state 
individual income, property, and other, taxes significantly discouraged growth through negative 
effects on household amenity attractiveness. In terms of state government expenditures, those on 
highways, and the environment and housing, could be identified as household amenity attractive. 
Yet, consistent with the review findings of Fisher (1997) negative household amenity effects 
were found for state education expenditures, as well as for expenditures on governmental 
administration. The education findings may be attributable to the spatial pattern of education 
spending in the state, rather than negative effects of spending in the county. The surprising 
finding of positive earnings effects of corporate income taxes fits a similar finding by Gyourko 
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and Tracy (1991) for metropolitan areas, though is inconsistent with the negative relationship 
often found in the literature (Felix, 2009). 
 Nevertheless, consistent dominant positive effects on firm profitability were found for 
county expenditures on primary and secondary education. Some evidence also was provided 
suggesting dominant firm profit effects from county spending on public safety. Consistent 
evidence also was found for positive household amenity effects from county highway spending. 
There was evidence of negative household amenity effects from increased county property taxes. 
The positive effects of expenditures sometimes exceeded the negative property tax effects, 
producing a net positive effect. We also found that fiscal characteristics were more important in 
nonmetropolitan counties which are not adjacent to metropolitan areas than in those which are 
adjacent. Most state and county taxes have negative household amenity effects in nonadjacent 
counties, while county expenditures on education and state expenditures on public safety were 
household amenity attractive. 
Overall, the results suggest that policy makers should be concerned with being cost-
competitive with certain taxes, though they also should be careful to be competitive in providing 
local education and other valued government services. Future research should more fully explore 
the contexts in which various mixes of fiscal policies promote economic growth. In addition, 
after the release of Census 2010 summary file data it can be determined whether the importance 
of state and local policies changed during an increasingly globalized economic environment and 
national stagnation of employment growth.  
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Table 1.  Fiscal Impacts on Equilibrium Wage and Rent  
  Profitable Profit Reducing No Profit Effect 
  (Cs < 0) (Cs > 0) (Cs = 0) 
Amenity (Vs > 0) Wage +/- ; Rent + Wage - ; Rent +/- Wage -; Rent + 
Disamenity (Vs < 0) Wage + ; Rent +/- Wage + /- ; Rent - Wage + ; Rent - 
No Amenity Value (Vs = 0) Wage + ; Rent + Wage - ; Rent - Wage 0; Rent 0 
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   Table 2. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Source Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
ln(earning2000) 
Log of annual earnings (in dollars) in 1999 for the employed 
over 16 
2000 Census 9.819 0.142 
ln(earning1990) 
Log of annual earnings (in dollars) in 1989 for the employed 
over 16 
1990 Census 9.647 0.188 
ln(housing2000) 
Log of weighted average median gross house rent ($/month) of 
owner and renter occupied housing units in 2000 using shares 
of owner and renter occupied houses. 
2000 Census 6.156 0.316 
ln(housing1990) 
Log of weighted average median gross house rent ($/month) of 
owner and renter occupied housing units in 1990 using shares 
of owner and renter occupied houses. 
1990 Census 5.731 0.302 
County Fiscal Variables  (differences in shares of personal income 2002-1992) 
Ctyproperty Revenue from property tax 1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.016 
Ctysales Revenue from sales tax 1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.003 
Ctyhighway Expend. on highway - charges on highway 1992/2002 COG 0.000 0.007 
Ctysafety Expend. on public safety (police + fire protection) 1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.004 
Ctynaturalrec 
Expend. on natural resource and parks recreation - 
corresponding charges 
1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.005 
Ctysewerage 
Expend. on sewerage and waste management - corresponding 
charges 
1992/2002 COG 0.000 0.004 
Ctyeducation Expend. on first and secondary education 1992/2002 COG 0.009 0.019 
State Fiscal Variables  (differences in shares of personal income 2002-1992) 
Stl_property Revenue from property tax 1992/2002 COG -0.001 0.004 
Stl_sales Revenue from sales tax 1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.003 
Stl_rest Revenue from selective, license, and other taxes 1992/2002 COG -0.001 0.003 
Stl_individual Revenue from individual income tax  1992/2002 COG 0.002 0.003 
Stl_corporate Revenue from corporate income tax  1992/2002 COG -0.001 0.001 
Stl_firstsecond Expend. on elementary & secondary education 
1992/2002 COG 0.003 0.004 
Stl_hospitalhealth Expend. on hospitals - corresponding charges 1992/2002 COG 0.000 0.002 
Stl_highway Expend. on highway - corresponding charges 1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.002 
Stl_publicsafety 
Expend. on public safety (police, fire, correction, etc) - 
corresponding charges 
1992/2002 COG 
0.002 0.001 
Stl_environhousing 
Expend. on natural resources, parks recreation., housing and 
community development, sewerage, solid waste management - 
corresponding charges 
1992/2002 COG 0.000 0.002 
Stl_govtadmin 
Expend. on government administration (Financial 
administration + Judicial and legal + General public buildings 
+ Other_governmental administration) 
1992/2002 COG 0.001 0.001 
Demographic Variables  (differences 2000-1990) 
Married  Percent population(15 years over) that are married 1990/2000 Census 0.119 0.029 
Female  Percent population that are female 1990/2000 Census -0.006 0.015 
Disability 
 Percent Civilian non-institutionalized population 16 to 64 
years  with a work disability 
1990/2000 Census 0.026 0.030 
Lingisolation     Percent households with linguistic isolation prob.  1990/2000 Census 0.002 0.014 
African  Percent population African-American   1990/2000 Census 0.001 0.014 
Native  Percent population that are Native American  1990/2000 Census 0.001 0.009 
Asianpacific  Percent population Asian and Pacific islands origin   1990/2000 Census 0.001 0.003 
Other  Percent population with other race background   1990/2000 Census 0.007 0.027 
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Hispanic  Percent population Hispanic   1990/2000 Census 0.016 0.028 
Highschool 
 Percent population 25 years and over that are high school 
graduates   
1990/2000 Census 0.133 0.036 
Somecollege 
 Percent population 25 years and over that have some college 
degree   
1990/2000 Census 0.100 0.025 
Associate 
 Percent population 25 years and over that have an associate 
degree   
1990/2000 Census 0.022 0.012 
Bachelor 
 Percent population 25 years and over that are 4-year college 
graduates   
1990/2000 Census 0.046 0.021 
Age7_17  Percent population 7-17 years   1990/2000 Census -0.005 0.015 
Age18_24  Percent population 18-24 years   1990/2000 Census -0.001 0.014 
Age25_54  Percent population 25-54 years   1990/2000 Census 0.015 0.017 
Age55_59  Percent population 55-59 years   1990/2000 Census 0.006 0.008 
Age60_64  Percent population 60-64 years   1990/2000 Census -0.002 0.008 
Age65up  Percent population over 65 years   1990/2000 Census -0.002 0.016 
Housing Characteristics (differenced 2000-1990)  
House age  Age of housing unit in  (years) 1990/2000 Census 5.812 3.244 
Share1bed Share of 1 bedroom house to total rooms  1990/2000 Census 0.003 0.018 
Share2bed Share of 2 bedroom house to total rooms  1990/2000 Census -0.020 0.029 
Share3bed Share of 3 bedroom house to total rooms  1990/2000 Census 0.008 0.030 
Share4bed Share of 4 bedroom house to total rooms  1990/2000 Census 0.006 0.019 
Share5bed Share of 5 bedroom house to total rooms  1990/2000 Census 0.001 0.010 
Sharemobile  Share of mobile units to all housing units  1990/2000 Census 0.014 0.036 
Shareplumb  Share with complete plumbing facility  1990/2000 Census 0.002 0.023 
Sharekitchen  Share with complete kitchen facility  1990/2000 Census -0.003 0.022 
Amenity Variables      
TempJan Mean temperature for January, 1941-71 ERS, USDA 31.476 12.279 
SunJan Mean days of sunshine for January, 1941-71 
ERS, USDA 
153.10
3 
33.639 
TempJul Mean temperature for July, 1941-70 ERS, USDA 75.560 5.623 
HumidJul Mean relative humidity for July, 1941-71 ERS, USDA 54.184 14.873 
Topography 
Topography score ranging from 1-21, where 1 represents flat 
plain and 21represents most mountainous land 
ERS, USDA 9.109 6.634 
Waterpct Percent of county area covered by water ERS, USDA 3.466 9.757 
Other Dummy Variables    
Census_division Census Division Dummy Variables 1-9  ERS, USDA 5.237 1.886 
RTW2  Right to work law dummy variable NRTW 0.560 0.497 
Notes: BEA=Bureau of Economic Analysis, REIS. SBEC=Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council. 
COG=Census of Government. ERS, USDA=Economic Research Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
HUD=U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. NRTW=National Right To Work Foundation. Total 
Nonmetropolitan Counties=1998. 
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Table 3. Dependent Variable: log(median house rent 2000)-log(median house rent 1990) for full sample 
of nonmetropolitan U.S. counties 
  
OLS   IV 
IV-w/out 
house 
characteristics 
IV-state 
fixed 
effects 
Intercept 0.71* 0.66* 0.71* 0.848** 
 
(7.20) (5.00) (5.89) (7.60) 
State fiscal variables 
(differenced)     Prop rty tax 2.49** -7.44*** -5.92 N 
 
(2.42) (1.86) (1.63) 
 Sales tax 4.23* 8.23 6.36 N 
 
(2.78) (1.34) (1.11) 
 Individual income tax -6.24* -22.86*** -15.69 N 
 
(5.39) (1.71) (1.56) 
 Corporate income tax -27.12* -1.52 0.998 N 
 
(6.50) (0.08) (0.06) 
 Other taxes -7.55* -25.66* -27.02* N 
 
(5.01) (4.25) (4.99) 
 Primary and secondary education 0.67 -6.86*** -9.94* N 
 
(0.63) (1.68) (2.83) 
 Hospitals & health 3.39*** -53.085** -38.91** N 
 
(1.72) (2.16) (2.25) 
 Highway expenditure -0.95 27.98* 30.18* N 
 
(0.65) (5.08) (6.07) 
 Public safety 8.47** 33.46 19.04 N 
 
(2.47) (1.56) (1.16) 
 Environment and housing 
expenditure 
9.55* 22.44* 16.85** N 
 
(5.25) (2.91) (2.49) 
 Governmental administration -17.06* -30.90** -14.01 N 
 
(5.71) (2.05) (1.13) 
 County fiscal variables 
(differenced) differences) (in 
differenced term) 
    Prop ty tax 0.34 2.35 2.64 -5.65* 
 
(1.13) (0.68) (0.94) (2.73) 
Sales tax -0.42 -9.12 -2.65 -0.027 
 
(0.30) (0.96) (0.38) (0.01) 
Primary and secondary education -0.13 3.85*** 3.26*** 2.66** 
 
(0.56) (1.75) (1.77) (2.45) 
Highway expenditure -0.14 -0.38 -0.77 0.16 
 
(0.24) (0.25) (0.59) (0.17) 
Public safety -0.072 -1.54 -1.69 8.65* 
 
(0.07) (0.34) (0.45) (3.00) 
Natural recreation -0.18 -2.94 -3.43*** -1.40 
 
(0.37) (1.47) (1.91) (0.95) 
Sewerage and waste mgt 0.32 0.012 -0.27 -1.29 
 
(0.50) (0.01) (0.17) (1.12) 
Housing Structure Variables Y Y N Y 
R-squared 0.53 NA NA NA 
No. of counties 1998 1996 1996 1996 
DWH test for endogeneity NA 213.63[0.00] 
[0.000] 
218.93 [0.00] 
[0.000] 
37.44[0.00] 
[0.000] Sargan overid test NA 31.19[ .00] 
[0.000] 
47.45 [0.00] 1.58 [ .45] 
Anderson canonical correlation 
LM test for relevance 
NA 7.32 [ .06] 12.56 [0.01] 23.66 [0.00] 
Ander on-Rubin test   NA 372.23[0.00] 
[0.000] 
386.88[0.00] 
[0.000] 
23.80 [0.00] 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. NA denotes not applicable. p-values reported in brackets for IV tests. 
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Table 4. Dependent Variable: log(earnings 2000)-log(earnings 1990) for full sample of nonmetropolitan 
U.S. counties 
 
OLS   IV 
IV-w/out 
demographic 
variables 
IV- state fixed 
effects 
Intercept -0.01 0.28* 0.10 0.43* 
 
(0.13) (2.95) (1.09) (3.40) 
State fiscal variable (differenced) 
    Property tax 0.87 1.33 1.55 N 
 
(0.93) (0.48) (0.55) 
 Sales tax 3.64* 8.73** 7.41*** N 
 
(2.62) (2.01) (1.66) 
 Individual income tax -3.48* -7.14 -9.85 N 
 
(3.42) (1.14) (1.26) 
 Corporate income tax 5.13 23.73** 24.04*** N 
 
(1.43) (1.97) (1.80) 
 Other taxes  -4.69* -1.54 -2.43 N 
 
(2.91) (0.35) (0.58) 
 Primary and secondary education -0.19 -2.27 -1.20 N 
 
(0.19) (0.88) (0.44) 
 Hospitals & health -0.31 -2.68 1.94 N 
 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.14) 
 Highway expenditure 2.26 -0.54 0.928 N 
 
(1.59) (0.14) (0.24) 
 Public safety 11.28* 4.79 -3.61 N 
 
(3.43) (0.37) (0.28) 
 Environment and housing expenditure 0.13 -1.87 -5.80 N 
 
(0.07) (0.35) (1.10) 
 Governmental administration -2.52 9.52 18.47*** N 
 
(0.96) (1.00) (1.92) 
 County fiscal variable (differenced) 
    Property tax 0.33 -0.33 -1.50 2.07 
 
(1.24) (0.17) (0.69) (1.12) 
Sales tax -2.08** -4.70 -4.57 -2.16 
 
(2.17) (1.09) (0.85) (1.18) 
Primary and secondary education -0.10 2.91* 3.47** 3.30* 
 
(0.45) (2.87) (2.41) (3.13) 
Highway expenditure 0.000 -3.47* -2.994* -4.18* 
 
(0.01) (3.60) (2.97) (4.53) 
Public safety 0.45 3.40 5.42*** 6.35* 
 
(0.64) (1.24) (1.85) (2.19) 
Natural recreation 0.05 0.41 0.23 -0.66 
 
(0.14) (0.31) (0.16) (0.43) 
Sewerage and waste 
mgtmgtmanagement 
0.22 1.33 1.18 1.97 
 
(0.33) (1.17) (0.98) (1.63) 
Demographic Variables Y Y N Y 
R-squared 0.54 NA NA NA 
No. of counties 1998 1996 1996 1996 
DWH test for endogeneity NA 113.39[0.00] 99.89 [0.00] 124.09[0.00] 
Sargan overid test NA 7.50 [0.02] 13.69 [0.00] 5.37 [0.07] 
Anderson canonical correlation LM 
test for relevance 
NA 18.47[0.00] 12.56 [0.01] 24.75 [0.00] 
Anderson-Rubin test   NA 104.47[0.00] 116.47 [0.00] 96.67 [0.00] 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level. NA denotes not applicable. p-values reported in brackets for IV tests. 
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Table 5. log(dep. variable  2000)-log(dep. variable 1990) for two subsamples  
 
Nonmetro adjacent 
 
Nonmetro nonadjacent 
 
IV-House IV-Earn 
 
IV-House IV-Earn 
Intercept 0.90* 0.34* 
 
0.37 0.29 
 
(6.37) (1.98) 
 
(1.36) (1.22) 
State fiscal variables (differenced) 
     Property tax 5.88 -2.83 
 
-16.72** -5.85 
 
(1.51) (0.71) 
 
(2.22) (1.00) 
Sales tax 7.70 1.18 
 
-2.56 11.26 
 
(0.83) (0.12) 
 
(0.21) (1.28) 
Individual income tax 2.07 -12.67 
 
-40.14* -2.93 
 
(0.16) (1.06) 
 
(2.73) (0.31) 
Corporate income tax -3.56 36.84** 
 
70.49 57.60*** 
 
(0.24) (2.18) 
 
(1.26) (1.68) 
Other taxes -20.671* -17.92** 
 
-51.11** -17.45 
 
(3.03) (2.46) 
 
(2.41) (1.34) 
Primary and secondary education -10.99** -3.84 
 
4.33 -1.46 
 
(2.22) (0.70) 
 
(0.63) (0.28) 
Hospitals & health -14.07 -26.60 
 
-72.01* -12.50 
 
(0.79) (1.58) 
 
(3.26) (0.81) 
Highway expenditure 12.10 -5.71 
 
40.92* 11.10 
 
(1.24) (0.67) 
 
(3.42) (1.37) 
Public safety 33.54 38.97 
 
51.19** 2.17 
 
(1.44) (1.52) 
 
(2.14) (0.11) 
Environment and housing  28.14* 0.57 
 
-24.50 -8.49 
 
(3.00) (0.06) 
 
(1.15) (0.61) 
Governmental administration -53.44** -13.32 
 
38.11 54.03** 
 
(2.57) (0.62) 
 
(1.18) (2.46) 
County fiscal variable (differenced) 
   Property tax -2.91 3.73 
 
-3.46 6.61*** 
 
(0.73) (0.94) 
 
(0.69) (1.71) 
Sales tax 6.74 -8.24 
 
-13.30*** 0.67 
 
(0.56) -0.71 
 
(1.71) (0.13) 
Primary and secondary education 1.18 1.95  
 
8.07*** 3.28 
 
(0.94) -1.29 
 
(1.90) (1.56) 
Highway expenditure -3.10 0.32  
 
-0.50 -4.80** 
 
(1.27) -0.13 
 
(0.21) (2.52) 
Public safety 4.07 3.18  
 
11.47 -14.93 
 
(1.48) -1.09 
 
(0.90) (1.59) 
Natural recreation -0.89 0.64 
 
-25.29*** -9.90 
 
(0.60) (0.46) 
 
(1.81) (1.20) 
Sewerage and waste management -1.98 3.00  
 
0.89 1.39 
 
(0.75) (1.20) 
 
(0.19) (0.42) 
Amenity/ERS Variables Y Y 
 
Y Y 
No. of counties 1039 1039 
 
957 957 
DWH test for endogeneity 96.43[0.00] 41.14 [0.00] 
 
158.96 [0.00] 93.000 [0.00] 
Sargan overid test 8.62 [0.01] 1.68 [0.43] 
 
9.94 [0.01] 6.59 [0.04] 
Anderson canonical correlation  3.94 [0.27] 5.17 [0.16] 
 
7.64 [0.05] 8.68 [0.03] 
Anderson-Rubin test  204.91[0.00] 45.02 [0.00]   257.16 [0.00] 108.44 [0.00] 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level. NA denotes not applicable. p-values reported in brackets for IV tests. 
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Table 6. log(dep. variable 2000)-log(dep. variable 1990) 
 
Housing Earnings 
 
IV 
IV-state 
fixed effects 
IV 
IV-state 
fixed effects 
Constant 0.55** 0.67* 0.24*** 0.36** 
 
(2.02) (4.43) (1.70) (2.07) 
State fiscal variables (differenced) 
   Property tax -12.72 N -2.70 N 
 
(1.08) 
 
(0.65) 
 Sales tax -5.32 N 3.64 N 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.56) 
 Individual income tax -18.40 N -4.08 N 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.50) 
 Corporate income tax 4.85 N 23.89 N 
 
(0.12) 
 
(1.59) 
 Other taxes -32.17*** N -1.17 N 
 
(1.84) 
 
(0.17) 
 Primary and secondary education -7.17 N -1.64 N 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.39) 
 Hospitals & health -78.09 N -6.21 N 
 
(1.41) 
 
(0.40) 
 Highway expenditure 30.64** N 0.73 N 
 
(2.44) 
 
(0.14) 
 Public safety 81.92 N 16.39 N 
 
(1.31) 
 
(1.00) 
 Environment and housing expenditure 39.96*** N 4.57 N 
 
(1.65) 
 
(0.61) 
 Governmental administration -64.77 N -0.47 N 
 
(1.35) 
 
(0.03) 
 County fiscal variables (differenced) 
   Property tax -9.21 -7.91** -2.86 0.06 
 
(1.21) (2.04) (1.07) (0.02) 
Sales tax -18.50 -1.96 -4.70 -2.92 
 
(1.15) (0.37) (0.58) (0.85) 
Primary and secondary education 9.71*** 3.47 4.59** 3.19*** 
 
(1.76) (1.35) (2.16) (1.88) 
Highway expenditure 3.954 0.17 -3.76 -5.05* 
 
(0.94) (0.10) (1.53) (2.59) 
Public safety 8.660 14.83** 8.08 13.40** 
 
(0.64) (2.03) (1.38) (2.41) 
Natural recreation -5.449 -1.18 -0.32 -0.48 
 
(0.98) (0.47) (0.15) (0.30) 
Sewerage and waste management -0.171 -1.31 1.64 1.27 
 
(0.05) (0.65) (0.87) (0.77) 
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Notes: In parentheses are t statistics adjusted for spatial clustering (within BEA labor market areas) using the Cluster 
command in STATA 10. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. NA denotes not 
applicable. p-values reported in brackets for IV tests. 
 
 
 
Primary and  -9.613*** -3.62 -4.21** -2.24 
Secondary Educ-Reg (1.72) (1.49) (2.13) (1.55) 
Highway expenditures-Reg -11.520 1.15 2.51 4.73** 
 
(1.38) (0.62) (0.70) (2.31) 
Natural recreation-Reg 6.005 2.84 -1.03 0.27 
 
(0.88) (0.72) (0.32) (0.10) 
Public Safety-Reg 4.797 0.52 -0.38 0.23 
 
(0.35) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
Sewerage and waste -0.067 1.81 0.42 1.19 
management-Reg (0.02) (1.04) (0.21) (0.69) 
Property tax-Reg 12.24 7.05*** 3.73 0.43 
 
(1.37) (1.89) (1.33) (0.20) 
Sales tax-Reg -7.814 -16.50** -8.50 -14.06** 
 
(0.54) (2.49) (1.35) (2.46) 
No. of counties 1996 1996 1996 1996 
DWH test for endogeneity 69.93[0.03] 88.67 [0.08] 76.33 [0.02] 68.34 [0.00] 
Hansen overid test 4.23 [0.12] 1.46 [0.48] 5.31 [0.07] 4.21 [0.12] 
Anderson canonical correlation 17.97 [0.00] 23.94 [0.00] 20.86 [0.00] 26.72 [0.12] 
Anderson-Rubin test  143.43 [0.00] 38.12 [0.00] 51.62 [0.00] 71.57 [0.00] 
